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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tashina Marie Alley appeals from her convictions for conspiracy to 
manufacture or deliver synthetic marijuana and conspiracy to deliver drug 
paraphernalia. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Boise police conducted an investigation of the manufacturing and sales of 
synthetic marijuana (called "spice" or "twizted potpourri") at the "Red Eye Hut" 
and a related warehouse. (Tr., vol. II, p. 498, L. 8 - p. 556, L. 16; p. 574, L. 15 -
p. 684, L. 24; p. 720, L. 4 - p. 829, L. 11.) Tashina Alley admitted she was 
knowingly involved in the manufacturing and sales. (Tr., vol. II, p. 830, L. 11 - p. 
834, L. 9.) The state charged her with conspiracy to manufacture, deliver, or 
possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance, conspiracy to deliver or 
possess with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia, and destruction of evidence. 
(R., pp. 30-34.) 
Alley joined a motion to dismiss filed by co-defendant (and husband) 
Morgan Alley. (R., p. 69.) The district court denied the motion to dismiss, 
concluding that the chemical formulations of the synthetic marijuana the Alleys 
were making and distributing were covered by the applicable statute. (R., pp. 
185-204.) 
Alley also objected to giving instructions that mistake of law was not a 
defense. (R., pp. 249-51, 277, 279-81; Tr., vol. Ill, p. 2107, L. 23 - p. 2128, L. 
13; p. 2170, L. 17 - p. 2172, L. 15.) The court ultimately gave the standard 
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instructions that mistake of fact is a defense but mistake of law is not a defense. 
(R., p. 405.) 
The case proceeded to jury trial (R., pp. 312-37), after which the jury 
convicted Alley on both conspiracy counts, but hung on the destruction of 
evidence count (R., pp. 435-37). Alley filed a timely notice of appeal from the 
district court's entry of judgment on the two convictions. (R., pp. 445-47, 451-
56.) 
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ISSUES 
Alley states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err by denying 
dismiss? 
Alley's motion to 
2. Did the district court err by instructing the jury that a mistake 
of law was not a defense to conspiracy? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Alley failed to show any error in the denial of the motion to dismiss? 
2. Has Alley failed to demonstrate that mistake of law is an affirmative 
defense to a conspiracy charge? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Alley Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of The Motion To Dismiss 
A Introduction 
The district court concluded the basis for the motion to dismiss was that 
"the Indictment does not state a crime" because "AM-2201 is not illegal" and, 
alternatively, that the statute is "unconstitutionally vague as applied" because of 
the "ambiguity" of whether AM-2201 was a controlled substance. (R., p. 185.) 
The district court noted that the pleadings did not specify the chemical 
formulation of the synthetic marijuana in question, but the evidence against the 
defendants was that they were making their synthetic marijuana using three 
different chemical formulations, to wit: AM-2201, JWM-019 and JWM-210. (R., p. 
186.1) The district court first concluded that AM-2201 was a synthetic marijuana 
within the scope of the statute. (R., pp. 186-96.) It then concluded the statute 
was not unconstitutionally vague. (R., pp. 196-203.) 
Alley contends the court erred by finding that synthetic marijuana made 
from AM-2201 is within the scope of the relevant controlled substances statute. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6 and appendices.) Because the conspiracy involved three 
formulations of synthetic marijuana, two of which are admittedly illegal, Alley's 
claim that the district court erred in denying the motion to dismiss fails because it 
is moot. In addition, the district court correctly concluded that AM-2201 is within 
the scope of the definition of synthetic marijuana in the relevant statute. 
1 "JWM-019" and "JWM-210" appear to be typos. The actual names for the 
synthetic cannabinoid formulas are JWH-019 and JWH-210. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796,798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. Alley's Challenge To The Denial Of The Motion To Dismiss Is Moot 
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial 
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief." State v. 
Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted). "A case is 
moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have 
no practical effect upon the outcome." In re Doe I, 145 Idaho 337,340, 179 P.3d 
300, 303 (2008) (quoting Goodson v. Nez Perce Bd. of County Comm'rs, 133 
Idaho 851, 853, 993 P .2d 614, 616 (2000)). The mootness doctrine precludes 
review when "the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally 
cognizable interest in the outcome " Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho 
State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281, 912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting 
Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429,432,816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991)). 
Alley "acknowledges that a determination that AM-2201 was not criminal 
would not necessarily result in a complete dismissal of the charges." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 6.) However, a complete dismissal was what was sought by the motion 
and denied by the district court. Her admission that she was not entitled to the 
relief she sought below makes the challenge to the district court's ruling on the 
motion moot. 
5 
Alley argues that she would have had a mistake of fact defense at the trial 
if AM-2201 was not within the scope of the statute {Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7), but 
cites to nowhere in the record that this was the issue she presented or the relief 
she sought. Moreover, she cites to nothing in the record indicating that she was 
mistaken about the specific chemical formulation used to make the synthetic 
marijuana. (Appellant's brief, p. 6 (citing only to her husband, Morgan Alley's, 
understanding of what chemical formulation he used in the production process).) 
Morgan Alley testified he told others that the synthetic marijuana was legal, but 
did not testify that he told them the specific chemical formulation of the synthetic 
THC he thought he was using. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1424, Ls. 20-23; p. 1483, L. 12 -
p. 1484, L. 4.) Alley never claimed below to have a mistake of fact defense 
based on a mistaken understanding of which specific chemical formulation the 
conspirators used to make the synthetic marijuana. Her attempt to assert one for 
the first time on appeal, without any evidentiary foundation, does not render the 
denial of her motion to dismiss justiciable on appeal. 
D. The District Court Correctly Applied The Plain Language Of The Statute 
Even if the merits of the argument are reached, Alley has shown no error. 
"When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of the statute, which 
are the best guide to determining legislative intent." Leavitt v. Craven, 154 Idaho 
661, _, 302 P.3d 1, 7 (2012) (internal quotes, brackets and citation omitted). If 
the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, "legislative history and other 
extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislature." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
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Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011 ). In this case the statutory 
language plainly expresses legislative intent to ban all synthetic THC. 
The statute in question, I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) (2011), 2 included in 
Schedule I, as hallucinogenic controlled substances, tetrahydrocannabinols 
('THC") or synthetic equivalents and "synthetic substances, derivatives, and their 
isomers with similar chemical structure such as ... [a]ny compound structurally 
derived from 3-( 1-naphthoyl)indole or 1 H-indol-3-yl-( 1-naphthyl)methane by 
substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl .... " I.C. § 37-
2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) (2011 ). In this case there is no dispute that AM-2201 meets all 
the terms of this statute ("synthetic substance," "similar chemical structure" to 
synthetic THC, "derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole or 1 H-indol-3-yl-( 1-
naphthyl)methane by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring") except 
whether the substitution is by "alkyl." (R., pp. 188-96.) Alley's contention is that 
there is no "substitution . . . by alkyl" because the "substitution at the nitrogen 
atom of the indole ring" is by alkyl halide, which is different from the alkyl group 
because it has a fluorine atom. (R., pp. 188-96.) The district court properly 
concluded that Schedule I included all synthetic THC, and therefore the chemical 
distinction claimed by Alley, which was not claimed to render AM-2201 
something other than a synthetic THC, did not remove AM-2201 from Schedule I. 
As determined by the district court, the language of the statute that 
"synthetic substances ... with similar chemical structure such as" the formulations 
2 The 2011 amendment was in effect at the times relevant to this case. 2011 
Idaho Session Laws, ch. 47, § 1, p. 109. A 2012 amendment is currently in 
effect. I.C. § 37-2705(d)(31) (Supp. 2012). 
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of synthetic THC found in subsection ii, plainly states that the formulations are 
representative and not exclusive. (R., pp. 188-96.) Thus, the difference of one 
atom (fluorine instead of hydrogen) between AM-2201 and the chemical 
formulation given as representative of synthetic THC did not render AM-2201 
outside the scope of the statute making illegal synthetic substances with similar 
chemical structure part of Schedule 1. 3 
Alley first argues the district court reached its decision "by resorting to 
legislative history." (Appellant's brief, Appendix A, p. 10.) This argument is 
apparently based on the assumption that "plain language" analysis and 
determination of legislative intent are mutually exclusive. (Id.) Besides being 
illogical, the argument that legislative intent is not gleaned from the language 
used in a statute is without basis in law. Leavitt, 154 Idaho at_, 302 P.3d at 7 
("When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of the statute, which 
are the best guide to determining legislative intent." (internal quotes, brackets 
and citation omitted)); Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506 (plain language 
of a statute is the "intent of the legislature"). The district court clearly relied on 
the plain language of the statute to determine that AM-2201 is within the scope of 
Schedule I, and referenced legislative history only as ultimately supporting the 
conclusion already reached under the plain language analysis. (Compare R., pp. 
3 The state on appeal, as in the trial court, contends that AM-2201 is in fact within 
the representative formulation provided in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) (2011). 
(See, sLll:., R., p. 191.) However, because the district court did not resolve the 
issue on this basis, but instead correctly held that the chemical formulations in 
the statute are merely representative and the real question is whether the 
synthetic has "similar chemical structure" to synthetic THC, this issue is not 
before this Court for resolution. 
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188-95 (plain language analysis) with , p. 195-96 (mentioning legislative 
statement of purpose and committee minutes only after reaching conclusion 
based on analysis of the language of statute).) Alley's argument is unsupported 
by the record. 
Alley also argues that the district court should have "account[ed] for the 
legislature's actions in removing references to pharmacological effects and 
extreme focus on structure." (Appellant's brief, Appendix A, pp. 10-12.) 
However, it is the plain language of the statute that controls, and that plain 
language brings synthetic marijuana with "similar chemical structure" to synthetic 
THC (such as AM-2201) within the prohibition of Schedule I, not just the chemical 
formulations enumerated after the phrase "such as." (R., pp. 188-96.) Even if 
this Court were to consider the proffer of extrinsic evidence of legislative intent it 
does not show error. Before the amendment a synthetic marijuana was within 
the scope of Schedule I only if it had both "similar chemical structure and 
pharmacological activity" of synthetic THC. See 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 47, 
§ 1, p. 111 (emphasis added). The amendment eliminated the element of 
"pharmacological activity." Id. That the state had one less element to prove did 
not narrow the statute, as apparently claimed by Alley; it in fact broadened it. 
The elimination of this portion of the statute in no way informs the inquiry into 
whether AM-2201 is within the scope of Schedule I. 
Alley next argues that the district court should have accepted the defense 
expert's testimony that AM-2201 "is in a different 'class'" than the compounds 
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listed in subsection (ii)(a). (Appellant's brief, Appendix A, p. 16.) Alley has failed 
to show that this testimony demonstrates any error by the district court. 
Dr. McDougal testified about a "portion of the molecule," specifically, a 
"five-carbon chain" located "off the nitrogen ring." (3/12/12 Tr., p. 39, Ls. 4-8.4) 
Because that chain ended with a "halogen fluorine atom" the chain was "an alkyl 
halide" and not an "alkyl group," which is composed only of "carbon and 
hydrogen." (3/12/12 Tr., p. 39, Ls. 6-24.) Once an atom such as the halogen 
fluorine is added, the compound is removed from the "alkyl group" and it 
"becomes a different class of compound." (3/12/12 Tr., p. 39, L. 23 - p. 41, L. 
23.) The district court specifically considered this testimony. (R., p. 191.) The 
court first rejected the testimony by noting that the legislature did not use the 
phrase "alkyl halide" or "alkyl group" but just "alkyl." (R., p. 192). Focusing on 
whether the carbon chain at issue was an "alkyl halide" or "alkyl group" "ignor[es] 
the language chosen by the legislature." (R., p. 192.) The district court also 
rejected Dr. McDougal's testimony distinguishing alkyl halides from alkyl groups 
because it related only to "a select portion" of the statute "rather than reading it 
as a whole." (R., p. 193.) Ultimately, because AM-2201 is a synthetic THC, 
synthetic marijuana made with it fell within Schedule I. (R., pp. 193-96.) 
Alley has failed to show error. Dr. McDougal did not testify that AM-2201 
was in a different "class" than synthetic substances with "similar" chemical 
structure "such as" certain formulations of synthetic THC (the relevant part of the 
4 References to the "3/12/12 Tr." include the proceedings of 3/12/12, 3/14/12 and 
6/12/12. 
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statute as determined by the district court). He testified that a part of the atom, a 
carbon chain, was an "alkyl halide" and not an "alkyl group" and assumed that 
the legislative use of the word "alkyl" meant to include the latter and exclude the 
former. The district court properly rejected the argument that this testimony 
demonstrated that AM-2201 fell outside the proscription of synthetic THC in 
Schedule I. 
Alley next argues that the examples of synthetic drugs in subsection (ii)(a) 
contain only chains of carbon and hydrogen, and therefore any synthetic drug 
with an atom other than carbon or hydrogen must be excluded as inconsistent 
with the examples. (Appellant's brief, Appendix A, pp. 16-18.) The district court 
concluded this argument "misses the point" because it, again, looks at only a 
very limited part of the statute. (R., p. 193.) Alley's argument would essentially 
make the list exclusive, when the plain language shows the opposite intent (R., 
pp. 193-96), and even Alley acknowledges that the list is "non-exhaustive" 
(Appellant's brief, Appendix A, p. 13). 
Finally, Alley invokes the rule of lenity. (Appellant's brief, Appendix A, pp. 
18-19.) "[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, 
history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what [the legislature] 
intended." Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 373, _, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 2508-09 
(2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The mere "grammatical 
possibility of a defendant's interpretation does not command a resort to the rule 
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of lenity if the interpretation proffered by the defendant reflects an implausible 
reading of the [legislative] purpose." Abbott v. United States, _ U.S. _, 131 
S.Ct 18, 31 n.9 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). Alley has failed to show any 
ambiguity in the statute, much less an ambiguity rising to the level of requiring 
application of the rule of lenity. 
The district court engaged in a thorough, thoughtful and correct analysis of 
the plain language of the statute and concluded that AM-2201 was within the 
scope of Schedule I. Even accepting the defense claim that AM-2201 is one 
atom different than the representative chemical formulation in subsection (ii)(a), 
such does not show that AM-2201 is not a "synthetic substance" with "similar 
chemical structure such as" the chemical formulations of synthetic THC provided 
in the statute. The district court correctly concluded that the plain language of 
the statute did not provide the chemical formulations as an exclusive list but 
instead as representative of the types of chemical formulations of synthetic 
marijuana prohibited. (R., pp. 188-96.) The plain language of the statute 
prohibited the synthetic THC known as AM-2201. 
11. 
Mistake Of Law Is Not A Defense To The Conspiracy Charges 
A. Introduction 
At trial the district court gave the approved jury instruction that mistake of 
law is not a defense. (R., p. 405; compare ICJI 1511.) Alley asserts that the 
instruction was error, arguing it is not enough that she entered a conspiracy with 
an objectively illegal goal, but that the state had to prove that the goal of the 
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conspiracy was subjectively illegal as well. (Appellant's brief, p. 7.) This 
argument fails because mistake of law is not a defense in Idaho. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). Whether a jury was properly instructed is a 
question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. 
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. 
Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000)). 
C. Ignorance Or Mistake Of Law Is Not A Defense To Conspiracy In Idaho 
It is a "deeply rooted" principle of American legal jurisprudence that 
"ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution." 
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991 ); see also State v. Fox, 124 
Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993) ("Ignorance of the law is not a 
defense." (citations omitted)); see also LC. § 18-101 (1 ), (5). An exception to this 
rule exists in limited circumstances when the claimed mistake "negatives the 
existence of a mental state essential to the crime charged." 1 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Substantive Criminal Law, § 5.6(a) (2d ed. 2012) (footnote omitted). But unless a 
criminal statute contains "specific language to the contrary, ignorance of a law is 
not a defense to a charge of its violation." Morgan v. Hale, 584 P.2d 512, 517 
(Cal. 1978), quoted in Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183; see also United 
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States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (unless crime requires proof 
of knowledge of law, "prosecution need not show that a defendant knew the 
illegality of the conduct with which he is charged"); United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 
639, 643 (10th Cir. 1995) (absent a clear statutory directive to the contrary, even 
specific intent crimes "do not, as a rule, necessitate a showing the defendant 
intentionally violated a known legal duty"). Idaho's conspiracy statutes contain 
no language, much less specific language, indicating that ignorance of the law 
would disprove guilt. 
The state charged Alley under both the general conspiracy statute, I.C. § 
18-1701, and the conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 
I.C. § 37-2732(f). (R., p. 30.) Pursuant to I.C. § 18-1701, a general criminal 
conspiracy is defined as follows: 
If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit 
any crime or offense prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho, 
and one ( 1) or more of such persons does any act to effect the 
object of the combination or conspiracy, each shall be punishable 
upon conviction in the same manner and to the same extent as is 
provided under the laws of the state of Idaho for the punishment of 
the crime or offenses that each combined to commit 
The conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act similarly 
provides: 
If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any offense 
defined in [the Uniform Controlled Substances] act, said persons 
shall be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both, which may 
not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, 
the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy. 
I.C. § 37-2732(f). 
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Pursuant to the plain language of these statutes, a person is guilty of 
conspiracy if he or she conspires with another to commit an illegal act and at 
least one of the conspirators does some act in furtherance of the illegal 
objective.5 Consistent with this plain reading of the statutes, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has repeatedly stated that a conspiracy under Idaho law consists of 
three essential elements: "(1) the existence of an agreement to accomplish an 
illegal objective, (2) coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the 
illegal purpose and (3) the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying 
substantive offense." State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 337, 193 P.3d 878, 884 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606, 798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct. 
App. 1990)); accord State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, _, 307 P.3d 1247, 
1251-52 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 690, 201 P.3d 657, 663 
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Lopez, 140 Idaho 197, 199, 90 P.3d 1279, 1281 (Ct. 
App. 2004); State v. Martin, 113 Idaho 461,466,745 P.2d 1082, 1087 (Ct. App. 
1987). See also ICJI 1101 (intent element of conspiracy is "that the crime would 
be committed" (bracketed language omitted).) While the state must prove as an 
element of a conspiracy charge that the defendant had the requisite intent to 
commit the underlying offense, nowhere in the conspiracy statutes or in the case 
law interpreting them is there an.y requirement that the state also prove the 
defendant intended to violate the law or knew of the illegality of the agreed-upon 
5 There is no language in I.C. § 37-2732(f) requiring an act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. Nevertheless, because the state also charged Alley under I.C. § 18-
1701, it is undisputed that an act in furtherance was an element of the conspiracy 
as charged. 
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act. In other words, intent to break the law or knowledge that a law will be 
broken is simply not an element of conspiracy under Idaho law. 
Rather than examining the plain language of the charging statutes, Alley 
relies on decisions by Arizona and California courts holding that conspiracy is a 
specific intent crime, and specific intent includes intent to violate the law. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-11.) Although "[i]t is generally accepted that conspiracy 
is a specific intent crime," Tankovich, 155 Idaho at_, 307 P.3d at 1252; Rolon, 
146 Idaho at 691, 201 P.3d at 664, "specific intent" does not usually, much less 
necessarily, mean intent to violate the law, see I.C. § 18-101 (5) ("knowingly" 
does not "require any knowledge of the unlawfulness of such act"); Blair, 54 F.3d 
at 643 (quoting United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1990)) ("[A] 
specific intent crime 'normally does not necessitate proof that the defendant was 
specifically aware of the law penalizing his conduct."'). As explained by the Court 
of Appeals in Rolon, the specific intent required for a conspiracy conviction is "the 
intent to agree or conspire and the intent to commit the offense which is the 
object of the conspiracy." Rolon, 146 Idaho at 691, 201 P.3d at 664 (emphasis 
original); accord Tankovich, 155 Idaho at_, 307 P.3d at 1251-52. As already 
established, in this case mistake or ignorance of the law does not negate intent 
to commit the underlying offenses. See,~' Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 
183 (intent required for possession of controlled substance is only "the 
knowledge that one is in possession of the substance"). Likewise, ignorance or 
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mistake of law does not negate the intent to agree or conspire to commit the 
underlying offenses. 6 
In United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975), the Supreme Court of 
the United States rejected Feola's argument that, on a charge of conspiracy to 
assault federal officers in the performance of their duties, the prosecution was 
required to "show a degree of criminal intent ... greater than is necessary to 
convict for the substantive offense." Like Idaho's conspiracy statutes, the federal 
statute at issue in Feola provided in relevant part that a criminal conspiracy is 
committed when "two or more persons conspire ... to commit any offense against 
the United States, ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the 
object of the conspiracy." Feola, 420 U.S. at 687 n.20 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
371 )). Upon examination of that statute, the Supreme Court found "no textual 
support for the proposition that to be guilty of conspiracy a defendant in effect 
must have known that his conduct violated federal law." kl at 687. The Court 
reasoned: 
The statute makes it unlawful simply to 'conspire ... to commit any 
offense against the United States.' A natural reading of these 
words would be that since one can violate a criminal statute simply 
by engaging in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that 
offense is nothing more than an agreement to engage in the 
prohibited acts. 
6 In this regard, the specific intent associated with conspiracy is similar to the 
specific intent to commit burglary (intent to commit a theft or felony) see State v. 
Brummett, 150 Idaho 339, 343, 247 P.3d 204, 209 (Ct. App. 2010), forgery 
(intent to defraud), State v. McAbee, 130 Idaho 517, 519, 943 P.2d 1237, 1239 
(Ct. App. 1997), or possession with intent to deliver, State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 
700, 705-06, 889 P.2d 729, 734-35 (Ct. App. 1994) (intent to deliver). 
Undersigned counsel is unaware of any authority indicating that ignorance or 
mistake of law would be defenses to these crimes merely because they require a 
finding of specific intent. 
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(ellipses original). The Court also pointed to its prior decisions in In re Coy, 
127 U.S. 731 (1888), and United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), noting 
that in both cases the Court "declined to require a greater degree of intent for 
conspiratorial responsibility than for responsibility for the underlying substantive 
offense." Feola, 420 U.S. at 687-88. 
Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have similarly held that, absent an 
express statutory directive to the contrary, the intent required to sustain a 
conspiracy conviction is merely that required for commission of the underlying 
substantive crime. See, ~. United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 
2012) (on charge of conspiracy to commit illegal gambling, government was 
required to prove same degree of criminal intent as required for proof of 
underlying substantive offense); United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (where substantive offenses did not require proof of intent to violate 
the law, defendants could be guilty of conspiring to commit substantive offenses 
even if they were not aware their actions were illegal); Blair, 54 F.3d at 643 
("prosecution need not prove a defendant intentionally violates a known legal 
duty in order to sustain a conviction under [general federal conspiracy statute] in 
cases where the underlying substantive offense does not impose such a 
requirement"); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding 
"no reason to believe ... from the words of the statute or from general criminal 
law doctrine, that the quantum of mens rea required for a RICO conspiracy 
should be different from or greater than that required for a substantive RICO 
offense"); People v. McLaughlin, 245 P.2d 1076 (Cal. App., 2d Dist., 1952) ("The 
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guilt of those who conspire to do an act which is prohibited by law is measured 
by their intent with reference to the act to be performed and not by the amount of 
their knowledge or ignorance of whether such acts are contrary to statute."). 
Like the conspiracy statutes at issue in the above-cited cases, the statutes 
under which Alley was charged offer "no textual support" for the conclusion that 
"intent to violate the law" is a necessary element of conspiracy. As in Feola, the 
statutes at issue in this case make it unlawful simply to "conspire to commit any 
crime or offense prescribed by the laws" of this state, I.C. § 18-1701, or to 
"conspire to commit any offense defined in" the Uniform Controlled Substances 
Act, I.C. § 37-2732(f). Also as in Feola, "[aJ natural reading of these words would 
be that since one can violate a criminal statute simply by engaging in the 
forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that offense is nothing more than an 
agreement to engage in the prohibited act." Feola, 420 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, 
as in Feola and the other cases cited, the state need not prove an intent to 
violate the law to sustain a conspiracy conviction, unless such intent is required 
for commission of the underlying substantive crime. Because the Uniform 
Controlled Substance Act violations that were the objects of the charged 
conspiracies in this case did not require knowledge of the illegality or intent to 
violate the law, see I.C. §§ 37-2732(a), 37-2734B; Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 
P.2d 183, Alley was guilty of conspiracy merely by having the specific intent to 
commit the proscribed acts (i.e., the delivery or possession with intent to deliver 
synthetic cannabinoids and paraphernalia, respectively), regardless of her 
knowledge or lack thereof that the acts were illegal. 
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Idaho's conspiracy statutes, by their plain language, do not require as an 
element either knowledge that object of the conspiracy is illegal or intent to 
violate the law. Nor do the crimes that were the objects of the conspiracies in 
this case require knowledge they were proscribed by law. Because neither the 
conspiracy statutes nor the substantive criminal statutes under which Alley was 
charged require any specific intent to violate the law, Alley's alleged ignorance or 
mistake of law was not a defense to the charged conspiracies. Alley has 
therefore failed to show error in the jury instruction that mistake of law was not a 
defense to her crimes. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
judgment. 
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